with traditional speech error data is that, as I read the literature, speech errors do not consistently support segments as the unit of analysis. They actually provide evidence for units at many different scales, from simple phonetic features (e.g., kick to pick) to whole phrases (such as the case of a laboratory in our own computer). I do not see how these data support segments over other size units of speech.
The second argument she presents for a psychological role for segments is the observation that if words were made from discrete particles (e.g., features or phonemes) that are not modified or blended when recombined, then it is easy to understand how new words might be coined. The ''particles'' could be recombined to make a great many potential new words. It is difficult to disagree with this but several points should be kept in mind.
1. Perfect unblended combination is not required for this purpose. Most phones are, in fact, partially blended since they are pronounced differently depending on their context (think of the [] in bad, bat, band, etc.). But only approximate discreteness is required for the ''particulate principle'' to support creation of new words. 2. This nondiscrete character of phonological particles is also true of genes which were once thought to be discrete little tokens but are now understood to be vastly more complex than previously thought and not nearly so discrete (see Pearson, 2006) . 3. As suggested by Fowler, my hunch is that the particulate character of phonology is something achieved by a language as a social institution. Individual speakers do not necessarily have to represent these particles. It is sufficient for the particles to be implicit in one's remembered inventory of speech chunks. Thus, for me to coin the new word glimp, I need only combine fragments from words like, eg, glitter, lump, glimpse, etc. I do not need to begin with /g/, /l/, /I/, etc.
So, the particulate principle itself does not provide support for simple, low-bit-rate phonemes since the principle can work even on patterns that are merely statistically differentiable in many dimensions. Thus the principle provides no support for a real-time role for discrete segments.
The third argument is that the ''success'' of alphabetical writing, both with the original ''inventors'' and with skilled users supports claims for real-time phoneme-like units.
My position is that a language, as a set of speech practices, typically tends to build an inventory of linguistic patterns (eg, words, morphemes) that reuse the same components in a number of distinct patterns. This is the phonology. These reused components can be feature-sized, segment-sized or consonant clusters, syllable codas, pitch patterns, rhythm patterns, etc. -of any size, in principle. It turns out that many of these patterns in various sizes can be distinguished from each other fairly well using a small set of letters laid out in a single row. The Greek-Phoenician alphabet engineers, around 1300 BCE, discovered that a single row of letters could specify the phonological patterns well enough to use for literacy. Letters are an engineering trick that fits many phonologies well enough that we find it worthwhile to train ourselves and our children to translate easily between letters and phonological patterns (Port, 2006) . So languages have phonological structures and these structures can be differentiated from each other into various semi-discrete categories. But once we have learned to interpret letters fairly well, then the graphically discrete letters seem to be the inherent units of language. Letters are a technology that encourages us to think that phonology is only about the letter-based descriptions. Phonemes are really the hypothesized psychological counterparts of orthographic letters.
As Fowler points out, research on reading has shown very clearly that essentially all skillful reading of modern orthographies, whether in English, Russian or Chinese, works by activating the phonological and motor structures of the reader's brain. One might have guessed that a skilled reader of Chinese would go straight from the graphic shapes of Chinese characters to meaning, but they do not. They activate pronunciations along the way (see Frost, 1998) . Fowler appeared to consider this an argument in support of traditional segmental representations. But this cannot be so since the neuro-motor representations during silent reading must surely run in continuous time and would have no use for an abstract, segmental, consonant-and-vowel representation (as far as I can tell).
So I certainly would not say that our impression that speech has segment-sized units is due solely to alphabet training. Languages do have some segment-sized units, along with many other sized units as well. What is true, however, is that alphabet skills do tend to highlight the segment-like (i.e., letter-like) properties of pho-nologies for us. Our literacy skills are thus only part of why phonemes seem so natural to us. (Formal linguistics, unfortunately, takes the letter-like properties of phonology as an apriori truth that we can build on.)
We need to discover the real, unbiased structures of each phonology in auditory terms. In my opinion, it will not do to say, as Fowler does, that phones and features live in the space of motor gestures. Speech is fundamentally auditory. We only need to hear language spoken to understand it. And as speech perceivers, we do not have direct access to the speaker's articulation. The auditory patterns, in frequency Â time, may emulate aspects of the articulatory space (i.e., exhibit the logic of speech articulation) yet the patterns that are important for auditory speech perception must logically remain auditory.
In several comments, Fowler seems concerned that I may reject any abstractions and employ only concrete exemplars. She asks ''what sameness listeners detect'' when they call two (different) things the same? But I assume that exemplar-like episodic memories include not only detailed sensory information but also many categories that events or objects in the episode might belong to by cultural convention. Grammars, like the rest of a culture, consist very largely of conventional categories: lexical ones, phonological ones, etc. Items belong to a category if, for whatever reason, community members agree that they do. Thus, syllables like /di/ and /du/ begin ''the same'' both (a) because the speakers think they do (due to familiarity with their written form) and (b) because the language gains benefit by beginning both syllables with similar gestures. Dr. Fowler and I seem to agree that a language and grammar are not structures to be found within individual speakers and should be looked for in the speech corpus. But she still offers arguments for why we should continue to trust our intuitions that speakers use phoneme-like representations of speech in real time. I have tried to show that the arguments she has raised are weak and unpersuasive. This makes one suspect that the primary reason for believing the words have a phonological spelling in memory is that they have an orthographic spelling on paper -and we academics have spent our lives sharpening our skills in the use of our orthography.
